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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
GLADYS WILSTED,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.

HUGH NATIO·N,
Defendant and Appellant

Appeal From the District Court of Salt Lake
County, Utah.
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT
This is an action at law in which the respondent
sued for damages for breach of promise of marriage. The appellant in his answer admitted that
at the time of the alleged promise he an.d the respondent were unmarried persons. He also admitted that he had married another woman, a.s al-
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leged in the complaint. He then denied generally
all the other allegations of the comp~laint and set
up no special defense whatever. The action was
tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the re·spondent.
The appellant assigns as error that there is no
substantial evidence to support the verdict and also
that the court erred in denying his. motions for a
non-suit, directed verdict and new trial.
Before discussing the merits of appellant's
contention, V\re \vill refer to some of the matters
mentioned in appellant's brief. Most of his brief
is made up of irrelevant observations, having no
bearing on the is.sue now before this Court, relating
not only to matters occurring at. the trial and
appearing in the record, but also as to matters
which do not appear in the record and which exist
only in the imagination or fancy of the appellant or
his counsel. Statements of ·fact are so intermingled
with flippant remarks and observations which are
not true or which a.re so exaggerated that one becomes be,vildered as to the object of the ap~pellant
and his counsel. It is impossible to tell whether
in presenting the case in this manner the appellant
is attempting to show that there is no substantial
,evidence to support the verdict, or simply to villify
and slander the respondent, or to amuse the court,
or is just trying to be funny. In any event much
of the matter set forth is simp·ly scurrilous and
untrue, and the manner in which it is s.tated is entirely improper, if not unethical, in making a presentation of the case to this Court for review.
The ap~pellant dwells at some length on the
fact that these parties were married and afterwards divorced. As to this, the· divorce became
final and both of them were unmarried persons and
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competent to enter into nn engagement of marriage
and contract of marriage 'vhen the promise was
made. The appellant does not deny this, but states
that the divorce \\~as procured by collusion and cites
authorities to the effect that a decree of divorce
thus obtained is void, It app·ears from statements
in appellant's brief that he and his counsel, Mr.
1\Iatthe\v·s "\Yere the principal actors in inducing the
respondent to olitain a divorce and a.re re~sponsible
for any collusion, if there was collusion, and in
view of this fact, this criticism comes with very
poor grace from them. In effect they are condemnjng themselves. Bnt all this has nothing to do with
this case as now presented to this Court. It is iml1ossible to understand \Yhat object the appellant
and his counsel have in making this contention, unless it is to ask this Court to declare the divorce
null and void; in which event the appellant, Iiaving
in the meantime married another woman, would be
a bigamist and guilty of a crime.
There is also contained in this brief a long dissertation on the attitude of app~ellant 's family
toward respondent and their objections to her
marriage to appellant. The respondent is called
a menial and, by other sla.nderojus phrases1 and~
innuendoes, the appellant and his counsel seek to
blacken her character and impute to her improper,
mercenary and vicious motives. All this s.eems to
us to he highly reprehensible and unethical and can
in no \Yay aid the Court in determinjng the question of law involved.
The appellant and his eounsel have also attempted to make a great deal of the fact that during the marriage of these parties they had sexual
intercourse, and with scandalous remarks and innuendoes have tried to make- out that these parties
continued theBe relations after the divorce and o·e-
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fore the promise to remarry. This is not true. This
whole insulting tirade is based on the testimony of
the respondent, (Ab. 25), as follows.:
'' Q. Now during the time you were married to him did you have intercourse with
him!
A. Yes.

And afterwards f
A. Yes..

Q.

After this last
A. Yes..

Q.

engagement~

After he res.umed his. relations ·and
was that because of this p-romise that he
was going to marry you . again f
A. It was."
Q.

A fair and reasonable construction of this is, that
while she had intercourse with him during her marriage to him, · there was no resumption of these
relations until after they were again engaged to he
married and that it was hecaus.e of thl.s p~romise
to marry her that she consented. This period was
from April 15, 1939 to July 23, 1939, when he married another woman.
As we conceive the case the only questions. involved are: Is there substantial evidence in the
·record to support the verdict and did the court err
in denying appellant's motions for a non-suit,
directed verdict and new trial.
It· will be observed that there is no contention
on the p1art of appellant that the court erred in the
admission of evidence nor in instructing the jury.
No requests for ins.tructions were submitted by the
appellant and no exceptions to the instructions
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given by the court 'vere taken by him or his
counsel.
Therefore, we will briefly call the court's. attention to the evidence, 'vhich we contend is amply
sufficient to support the verdict. It is conceded
that on April 15, 1939, each of these parties was
unmarried and each was competent to enter into
a contract to marry each other and to marry. It
is also conceded tha.t on July 2'3, 1939, the ~appel
lant married another woman, so that if there was·
a promise to marry the respondent, this marriage
constituted a breach.

THE RESPONDENT CONTENDS THAT THE
MUTUAL PRO~MISE TO MARRY BETWEEN HER AND THE APPE I-lL.A. NT ~
AS ALLE~ED IN HER COMBLAINT, IS
PR0\1ED, NOT ONLY BY A p,R\EPOND,ERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, BUT BEYO·ND
ALL REASONABLE· DOUBT.
1

The respondent testified, (Ab. 16) :
''About Ap,ril 15, 1939, we were both unmarried. He (the appellant) said he loved
me and '\vanted me to marry him. . . .
I promised I would marry him, but no
date was set.''
This was a proposal and an acceptance and
a mutual p,romis.e to marry. The fact that no date
was set, makes no differenee. The law on (that
question is briefly set. forth in
11 Corpus Juris Secundus, p. 776, Sec. 9, _
as follows:
"While the promise may of course be to
n1arry at a fixed time, it is not necessary
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to the validity of the contract that any
specific time for performance be a,g~I"eed on
as the law will imply, where no time is
fixed by the ·parties, that the contract is
to plerform within a reasonable time; and
a. promise to marry within a reasonable
time is sufficiently definite as to time of
performance to support an action for its
breach.'' Cases cited.
The :appellant in his answer denied that there
was a promise. In giving his testimony, however,
he admitted that there was a promise by him to
marry the respondent, hut at first said it was con-·
ditioned upon the removal of the objections of hiR
family, and then afterwards admitted that it was
not so conditioned, but was an absolute promise·,
substantially as stated by respondent. His testi ·_
mony on this point is as follows:
(Ab. 28) "There was a promise of marriage if the objections, could be overcome.
(Ab. 29) Q. Did you state that you were
not going to let any objections they had
stand in your way~
A. If I could have overstepped them.
Q. And then you said you were g'Oing to
marry her (respondent) anyhow didn't
you~

A. Yes.
Q. And when I asked you if the~ objections of your children had been removed,
you said you were not going to let those
things stand in the way of your happiness,
didn't you~
A. Yes.''
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The appellant here admits the promise·. and
\Vhile at first he says it was conditional, he afterward5 says that not\vithstanding the objections
which his children had to his marriage he was going to marry the respondent.

On the question of \vhether the promis.e wa.s conditional, the respondent testified,

(~~b.

25):

"As I understood ~Ir. Nation's p~roposal,
the objections of his family were not to
stand in the vva y at all.

Q. That is, you understood that he was.
not going to let the family stand in the
way~

A.

Yes.''

.· . . We \Yere going to be married any'vay regardless of ".,.hether his family still
objected or not.''
This is also corroborated by the testimony of
the appellant relating to his efforts to have the
divorce set aside. (Ab. 29). This. is also corroborated by the letters of the appellant to r~spondent.
All these letters contain words of endearment and
affe:ction and no one can read them and not be
convinced beyond all doubt that the appellant
,promised to marry the respondent, without ·any
condition, and that he intended to carry out the
.
promise.
The promise of marriage was in- express
words, a.s shovvn by this testimony and other evid<~nce, but even if it we-re not so, it would not
change the matter. A p1romise to marry need not
be in express or formal words. All that is neces~ary is that the mjnds of the parties have met and
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that there is a mutual understanding between them
that they are to be married to each other.
4 R . C . L . , P·· 145.

THE RESPO,NDENT ALSO CONTEND·S THAT
APPELLANT'S MOTIO·NS FOR A NONSUIT, DIRECTED VERDICT AND NEW
TRIAL, WERE PlRO·P'ERLY DIE·NIED BY
THE COURT.
The motions for a non-suit and for a directed
verdict were both based on the insufficiency of the
evidence to justify submission of the cas~e to tlie
jury. It seems to us that from what we have already said on that ques.tion, it is unnecessary to go
into the matter further. There certainly was sufficient evidence, as shown by the record, to which
'we have referred, to justify the court in submitting the case to the jury.
As to the motion fior a new trial, while all
grounds were stated in the notice of intention, the
only ground relied on or pre·sented was that of
newly discovered evidence. This was based on the
affidavits of Della May Nielsen and Edith Willis,
found at pages 29 and HO respectively, of the Transcrip,t. The most casual glance at these affida;vifs
will convince the Court that there was absolutely
:nothing stated in either of them that could in any
'vay be considered as a ground for a new trial.
Even counsel for the appellant seems. to be of the
same opinion as. he does not mention this matter
in his brief.
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THE RESPO·NDENT CONTENDS THAT AS
THIS IS AN ACTION AT LAW THE MATTERS OF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
·WITNESSES ARE NOT BEFORE THE
COURT; .6-t\.ND THAT IF THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
TO SUPPO·RT THE VERDICT, THERE
BEING KO ERiRORS AT LAW PRESENTED, THE JUD·GMENT S H 0 U L D BE
AFFIRMED.
There are many decisions of this Court on
this subject. This Court has. uniformly held that
in actions at law if there is substantial evidence to
support the judgment it will not interfere. This
rule is so well established that citations seem unnec.essary.
There is ample evidence) as
ord, to sustain the verdict and
case and there are no errors of
presented. Therefore we submit
should be affirmed.

shown by the recjudgment in this
law mentioned or
that the judgment

Respectfully,

DUNCAN & DUNC-4.\N,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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